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PEACE THROUGH LAW: THE ROLE
AND LIMITS OF ADJUDICATION*
CLARENCE MoRRIS t
"The power of the judge," says Ehrlich, "is not sufficient to over-
come the enormous powers of resistance inherent in society which would
rise up in opposition to an attempt to place society on a new foundation
by means of a judicial pronouncement . . . . The judge has often,
it is true, disregarded the law in the service of an unscrupulous sov-
ereign power; occasionally, supported by the law, he has been able to
offer successful resistance to a strong sovereign power; but he has
never risked a conbat [sic] with the state, society, and traditional
law." I Ehrlich's point is that courts come into being, not as policy-
directing organs of the state capable of initiating and organizing new
forms of social movement, but rather as organs of society whose novel
contributions can, at most, articulate social trends already widely in-
grained in society. To be more concrete, courts cannot initiate, for
example, a system of collective farming, or a scheme of international
disarmament inspection; they have, on the other hand, been able to
adopt equitable defenses, recognize and define the right to privacy, and
reformulate the laws of spite fences-without legislative action and
without involving themselves in enforcement crises.
The judicial need for social roots explains, in part, the insistence
that courts write opinions disclosing the grounds on which their deci-
sions rest. A court seems to act "legitimately" (and I use this word
advisedly) only when its premises command social support. It legiti-
mates its decisions by announcing those premises. Cardozo talks of this
when he says that retrospective judicial lawmaking would be intolerable
if community ideas of social justice were not usually the source of
judicial doctrines.'
There are great areas, then, in which no one would suppose judicial
action appropriate. What is not so clear is that judicial substcntive
justice plays no part in many cases which courts dispose of on their
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merits. We labor under the delusion that courts decide all disputes
which they try on the merits. Courts do, of course, dispose of all these
disputes, but disposition and decision are not the same thing.
The point I am trying to make is this. When a court does not
know what to do, it usually tries to do nothing-it holds that the com-
plainant has failed to establish a "legal" right. This, of course, is what
the court should do, for any other holding would be meddlesome or
random activity. However, not all inaction results from indecision.
Sometimes a court is convinced that a complainant deserves no relief.
For example, a holding in a slander suit that truth is a defense is not a
decision that the defamed merely has failed to persuade the court that
he has a right; it is a firm decision that his claim lacks merit.
This distinction bears on the "rationality" of judicial decision. A
judicial decision can be rational only when supported by acceptable
substantive grounds-positive or negative. A judicial decision is pre-
rational when a court does not know what to do, and therefore does
nothing. I do not, of course, say irrational. A judge unable to choose
between competing theories of litigants is no more irrational than a
physicist unable to choose between the competing theories of the nature
of light. The difference is that the judge, unlike the scientist, cannot
willingly suspend judgment: litigation must end quickly; scientific
ignorance can persist until substantive discovery is made.
Unfortunately, a pre-rational judicial decision has forensic status
as a precedent and spawns a rule for refusing to act in other similar
cases. This is not entirely a mistake of logic-making something out
of nothing. If judges are to respect the justice of the rule requiring
equal protection of the law, defendants answering to similar complaints
must be treated similarly. Of course, judicially announced law can be
changed-a court whose reason for change is not based on the identity
of litigants is no undue respecter of persons. But a new holding may
require stronger conviction when it overrules an old one than when it
pronounces judgment unembarrassed by precedent. I am not naive
about the ability of lawyers to differentiate the indistinguishable, and
neither are judges who use this ability. (Parenthetically, we can re-
mark the wisdom of the system that permits a top appellate court to
refuse to hear a case that it is unready to decide. This is no panacea;
it can result in a failure to give attention to problems ripe for substantive
judicial judgment.)
Rationality of decision, as distinguished from what I have called
pre-rationality, is demonstrated only when the court "speaks justice"-
a metaphor by which I am trying to convey a philosophic, moral, psy-
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chological, and social meaning. Satisfying judicial rationality is a work
of art, in a sense. Though I am by no means his disciple, let me quote
Ehrlich again. "[T]hough justice is based on social trends," he says,
"it requires the personal activity of an individual to make it effective.
In this it is most like art. The artist, too, as we know today, does not
produce his work of art from his inner self; he can but give shape to
that which society furnishes him with. . . . [J]ustice owes to society
only its rough content, but owes its individual form to the artist in
justice who has created it." 3
Pushing on from Ehrlich's analogy, note these two points: first,
art, judicial or aesthetic, is unlikely to satisfy those who must live with
it unless it seems to be the right answer to the problem faced. Esoteric
solutions are accepted only from those whose stature guarantees their
wisdom and even these tall ones must look to their laurels when the
critics are skeptical of their answers. So excellence in works of art or
law is social in effect as well as in cause; the artist gets his materials
from society and completes his mission only when he returns to society
a product that will be accepted as right. Second, artists and jurists
have roles, recognized by themselves as well as by society. These roles
channel their behavior and set its conceivable limits. "We must keep
within those interstitial limits," says Cardozo, "which precedent and
custom and the long and silent and almost indefinable practice of other
judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made
innovations." 4
Legislators are permitted more leeway in experiment than judges.
"There are," says Traynor, "no adequate precedents for much of the
law that must be formulated today to regulate multiminded, multi-
handed human beings. The main preoccupation of such law must be
with the future. Its main formulation," he continues, "belongs ap-
propriately to legislators, who are freer than judges to write on a clean
slate, in terms of policy transcending case or controversy, and to erase
and rewrite in response to community needs." I While the opponents
of a bill in Congress may attack it as a dangerous experiment, yet
Congress did not step out of its role when, for example, it first adopted
the municipal bankruptcy law for a three-year period.8 Imagine, how-
ever, how Blackburn, J., would have sounded had he said in Rylands
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v. Fletcher: 7 "For the next three years, an impounder of a substance
likely to do damage if it escapes, acts at his peril." I do not mean courts
never retreat from their mistakes; they have recently done so, for
example, in the law of prenatal injuries.8 I do not mean decrees in
particular cases may not be revised; they often are in injunction and
nonsupport cases. I do mean that the formal principle announced
by a court making a new law must be treated as though it were en-
during, and it will, therefore, tend to endure. A Cardozo must be
willing to rule, in effect, that, from the MacPherson case 9 on, manu-
facturers owe consumers a duty to use care for their safety.
So I doubt Cardozo himself when, imbued with modem prag-
matism, he says, "not all the progeny of principles begotten of a
[judicial] judgment survive . . . to maturity. Those that cannot
prove their worth and strength by the test of experience are sacrificed.
,, " We are not realistic if we put great faith in this hope for
judicial activism. I agree, rather, with Traynor when he says:
There is now wide agreement that a judge can and should par-
ticipate creatively in the development of the common law. Yet
each time he does so, he must reckon with the ancient suspicion
that creativeness is a disturbing excess of skill, at odds with cir-
cumspection, darkly menacing the stability of the law.
The real concern is not the remote possibility of too many
creative opinions but their continuing scarcity. The growth of the
law . . . is . . . hampered by a judicial lethargy that masks
itself as judicial dignity . . . .1
Bentham, referring to the shock of judicial novelty, says "nor is
the mischief cured till a strong body of connected decisions either in
confirmation of the first anomalous one or in opposition to it have
repaired the broken thread of analogy .... " 12 The judge who
readapts the law disturbs tradition in vain and denies even-handed
justice to the parties before him, unless he acts with the conviction that
justice will settle in the new channel which he opens. In a court
staffed with heterogeneous judges, the problem of inventive, creative
decision (as opposed to pre-rational inertia) is more difficult. Learned
Hand, writing more than forty years ago, said:
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Until within a very few decades the . . . bench and bar could
utter justice without misgiving or constraint. . .. The self-
conscious elements of society were homogeneous and the diverg-
ences not fundamentally distracting. . . . All this is changed
... . [Other classes'] demands are vocal which before were
dumb . . . . If justice be a passable accommodation between
the vital and self-conscious interests of society, it has taken on a
meaning not known before."3
If Hand is right, our widened American spectrum of values greatly
taxes judicial lawmaking. How much more difficult will be the task
of judges in an international tribunal to know their own minds and to
know, in addition, that they must persuade not only their colleagues
but also those who follow after if their court is to establish a rule of
substantive law rather than a series of conflicting decisions or an
ongoing practice of doing nothing.
This Comment is about both the role of, and the limits on, adjudi-
cation. Most of my words have been negative-about what courts can-
not or will not do. But the affirmative role of adjudication has indeed
been impressive in the past. In England, the King's courts, inventing
and applying their own law, were able to advance the King's peace over
the conflicts of manors and baronies-each with its own law. I heard
Thurman Arnold say years ago, "Who could have predicted the public
utility holding company at the time of the Civil War?" Who, indeed,
at the time of Westminster II could have predicted how the "consimili
casu" clause was to extend the function of common-law courts from
trespass, to case, to assumpsit; and how the remedies for checking the
feudal foray were to expand into the whole common law of torts and
contracts? So, too, the adjudicative process may indeed serve the
cause of world peace. My fear is that we hope for too much too soon
in this direction. "The success of the law as a unifying force," says
Thurman Arnold, "depends on making emotionally significant the idea
of a government of law which is rational and scientific." "4 An inter-
national adjudicative process can play some part in unifying nations,
but other forces are indeed needed for a rational and scientific inter-
national polity.
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